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NOTE
MORTGAGES ON AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY IN
KENTUCKY
This note is principally concerned with the law in Kentucky
applicable to mortgages on after-acquired property when there is
a conflict of interests between the mortgagee and third parties.
After-acquired property, as the subject-matter of a mortgage, is
property which at the time of execution of the mortgage thereon
is either (1) not yet acquired by the mortgagor, or (2) not yet in
existence. Any kind of property of which a present interest
could be mortgaged, whether corporeal or incorporeal, might con-
ceivably be the subject-matter of a mortgage executed before the
property is acquired or comes into existence.
After-acquired property mortgages are uniformly held ef-
fective between the parties-even if they are regarded only as
contracts to mortgage when the property is acquired; but as to
intervening claims of third parties there has been dispute. Judge
Story is credited with first enforcing such mortgages against third
parties in the United States. In Mitchell v. Winslow,' from the
federal circuit bench, he decided that where an unincorporated
manufacturing concern had executed a mortgage which included
all machinery to be purchased by the mortgagor within the en-
suing foilr years, the lien of such mortgage was enforceable in
equity, and was valid against attaching creditors, even though
nothing had been done by the mortgagee to perfect his lien after
the machinery was acquired by the mortgagor.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1857 decided in Phillips v.
Winslow' that where the charter of a railroad corporation author-
ized pledges of its property, franchises, rights, and credits,
mortgages on future property were within such charter powers
and were valid against subsequent judgment creditors.' Here, as
in Mitchell v. Winslow, the mortgagee had done nothing to perfect
his lien.
No cases concerning mortgages on after-acquired property of
an earlier date than Phillips v. Winslow have been found in the
reports of Kentucky decisions with the exception of Hughes v.
17 Fed. Cas. 527, No. 9,673 (C.C.D.Me., 1843).
257 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 344, 68 Am. Dec. 729 (1857).
'Accord: Galveston Railroad v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459 (U.S.
1870); In re American Fuel and Power Co., 151 F. 2d 470 (C.C.A.
6th, 1945); Columbia Finance and Trust Co. v. Kentucky Union Ry.
Co., 60 Fed. 794 (C.C.A. 6th, 1894); United States Cast Iron Pipe and
Foundry Co. v. Henry Vogt Machine Co., 182 Ky. 473, 206 S.W. 806
(1918); Georgetown Water Co. v. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co.,
117 Ky. 325, 78 S.W. 113, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1739 (1904); see Westing-
house Eldctric Mfg. Co. v. Citizens Street Railway Co., 24 Ky. L.
Rep. 334, 68 S.W. 463 (1902).
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Graves (1822),' and Forman v. Proctor (1848)*r In Forman v.
Proctor, a leading case, a mortgage on farm livestock was held to
cover the produce or increase of the female animals, as an incident
following the condition of the principal, even though there was no
mention of such increase in the mortgage contract. The mortgage
lien was held to have priority over the lien of subsequent judgment
creditors of the mortgagor. Hughes v. Graves deals with a mortgage
on a slave woman. The mortgagor sold the slave to a purchaser
for value without notice of the mortgage, and it was held that the
mortgage lien applied not only to the woman but also to two children
born after execution of the mortgage. One of the children was born
after the woman was sold, but it does not appear whether that child
had been conceived at the time of the sale.
These cases represent the doctrine of "potential existence" as
applied in Kentucky. This doctrine was born in an effort by the
English courts to escape the rigorous application of the common-
law maxim that "a man cannot grant or charge that which he hath
not." In the parent case of Grantham v. Hawley' a lessor, in making
a twenty-one year lease, covenanted and granted that the lessee
should have the corn growing upon the ground at the end of the
term. This was held to grant the lessor's present interest in the
corn to be grown twenty one years thereafter, and therefore to be
effective against the grantee of the lessor's reversion. In the words
of the court:
"And though the lessor had it not actually in him, nor
certain, yet he had it potentially; for the land is the
mother and root of all fruits. Therefore he that hath it
may grant all fruits that may rise upon it after, and the
property shall pass as soon as the fruits are extant : ' '"
The doctrine was extended to include the increase of female
animals, but has not been carried farther.' In Kentucky it has been
applied to the progeny of animals but denied in the instance of
future crops.' without discussion in either case of the historical
origin of the rule or the reason for the partial departure therefrom.
In Kentucky the rules developed by the cases set out have
marked, in general, the extent to which future property mortgages
have been enforced against third parties. The court has frequently
stated the general rule as being that a mortgage of after-acquired
property is void against the mortgagor's creditors or purchasers for
value, subject to exception (1) with regard to the increase of female
animals, and (2) where a corporation mortgages property acquired
under its charter powers.
It is desirable to pause in our discussion of decisions and con-
'11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 317 (1822).
'48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 124 (1848).
'Hobart 132, 80 Eng. Rep. 281 (1615).7
WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) sec. 133.
'Infra, pp. 9-10, and n. 26.
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sider the variety of factors and situations involved in the problem
of mortgages on future property. First, the mortgagors fall into
three well defined groups, namely: quasi-public corporations, private
corporations, and individuals. Entirely apart from any doctrinaire
approach there is sound reason based on practical economics for
carrying this distinction into the judicial decisions. Some writers
take the position that after-acquired property mortgage provisions
should be enforced only where the mortgagor is a quasi-public
corporation; but, although the law at one time tended in that di-
rection, it is true today that the general rule gives effect to after-
acquired property clauses in the mortgages of private as well as
quasi-public corporations." U n d o u b t e d 1 y the numerous future
property mortgages executed by public service corporations made
apparent to the courts the practical necessity of giving them effect,
and thus served as an opening wedge .for introduction of the
practice of giving like effect to like instruments executed by private
corporations. As well said in a 1904 Kentucky opinion."
",Where negotiable bonds have been issued, secured by
a mortgage of a railroad company on property then on
hand or thereafter to be acquired, the mortgage is upheld,
in favor of the bondholders, as to after-acquired property;
otherwise the long-term bonds could not be issued, and
money raised upon them."
In Moulder-Halcomb Co. v. Glasgow Cooperage Co." a private
manufacturing corporation executed to a trustee a mortgage on all
assets then owned and thereafter to be acquired, to secure payment
of negotiable bonds of the corporation. A creditor attached certain
subsequently acquired assets of the insolvent corporation prior to an
assignment for benefit of creditors being made, and the court held
the mortgagee-trustee had a lien superior to that of the attaching
creditor. This case extended the rule, previously applied to public
service corporations, to a mortgage executedby a private corpora-
tion. It was said that an exception to the general rule against
mortgages of future property occurs where property is acquired
"by a corporation, in the exercise of powers conferred by its
charter."'
,'See Hamilton, Future Property Clauses in Corporate Mortgages
(1930) 4 TEMP. L. Q. 131, for a discussion beyond the scope of this
note.
, Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F. 2d 513
(C.C:A. 10th, 1929); Cummings v. Consolidated Mineral Water Co.,
27 R.I. 195, 61 Atl. 353 (1905);.First Nat. Bank of Alexandria v.
Turnbull, 73 Va. 695, 34 Am. Rep. 791 (1880); Benson v. Woods
Motor Parts Corp., 115 W. Va. 200, 174 S.W. 895 (1934); Cohen and
Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause (1939) 87 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 635, 649.
"Georgetown Water Co. v. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co.,
117 Ky. 325, 78 S.W. 113, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1739 (1904).
"173 Ky. 519, 191 S.W. 275 (1917.)
Ibid, p. 524.
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The next case on the topic, United States Cast Iron Pipe and
Foundry Co. v. Henry Vogt Machine Co.,1' 1918, involved a mortgage
executed by the Providence Water and Utilities Co., a public service
corporation. The mortgage on future property, it was held, gave
rise to a lien on certain essential water pumping machinery superior
to the lien of the vendor for unpaid purchase money.
It was said that in the case of a public service corporation
an after-acquired property mortgage is valid as to property "which
composes an integral, indispensable, or necessary part of its
machinery or fixtures, to perform things which it is empowered by
its articles of incorporation to do."' On such property it displaces
a lien for materials furnished, for purchase money, or where a vendor
sells to the mortgagor under a contract to retain title until payment
in full is made.' The only reason given by the court for the rule
is that when a prior lien-holder is dealing with a public service
corporation he has notice of the prospective lien of the general
mortgage. The rule is limited to public service corporations, the
court saying that in other cases where a mortgage on future prop-
erty is valid the lien attaches to the property in the condition in
which it comes into the ownership of the mortgagor, and the general
mortgage does not displace prior liens, even though they be junior.
The rule of future property mortgages has been substantially
broadened since Phillips v. Winslow. In that case the charter was
construed as authorizing the company to mortgage property which
it had not yet acquired, and the decision was based on this charter
power. However, in the Moulder-Halcomb case and the Foundry
Co. case the rule is given that a mortgage of future property is
valid as to any property acquired by a corporation in the exercise
of its charter powers. Under this statement of the rule any mortgage
of future property by a corporation would be effective against third
parties, whether the corporate charter authorized mortgages on
future property or not, so long as the property was acquired within
182 Ky. 473, 206 S.W. 806 (1918).
Ibid, p. 482.
' Accord: Columbia Finance and Trust Co. v. Kentucky Union
Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 794 (C.C.A. 6th, 1894); Westinghoise Electric Mfg.
Co. v. Citizens Street Railway Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 334, 68 S.W. 463
(1902); But cf. United States v. New Orleans Railroad, 12 Wall. 362
(U.S. 1870), a case arising in Kentucky, saying that a mortgage by a
railroad covering all future acquired property attaches only to such
interest therein as the company acquires, subject to any liens under
which it comes into the company's possession, and holding a pur-
chase money lien on rolling stock, though junior, superior to the
lien of the general mortgage. A distinction is made that the rolling
stock did not become "affixed to and a part of the principal thing."
In Galveston Railroad v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459 (U.S. 1870), the
court reached a contrary result as to railroad rails. These dis-
tinctions are made in the efforts of the courts to synthesize the
doctrine of accession with the law applicable to encumbrances on
future property, with the additional factor of a tendency to favor
such encumbrances where executed by public service corporations.
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the charter powers. This statement of the rule is given substance in
the Foundry Co. case because the mortgagor there was a foreign
corporation and neither its charter nor its franchise, nor a statement
of the contents of either, was before the court. It is interesting
that this extension of the rule was first stated as dictum in a case
involving a mortgage on future farm crops executed by an in-
dividual,'7 where it is said that an exception to the general rule
against mortgages on after-acquired property is where property is
"acquired under certain circumstances by a corporation in the ex-
ercise of powers conferred by its charter," citing Phillips v. Winslow,
supra.
Although in many jurisdictions mortgages on future property
executed by individuals have been enforced, Kentucky has not gone
so far, extending enforcement of such clauses, with the exception
of the increase of female animals, only to mortgages executed by
corporations. It is altogether likely our court once felt there would
be no adequate means of protecting third parties if individuals were
permitted to mortgage future property, but that such mortgages
were a business necessity in the case of many corporations; and
third parties, being presumed to know the law, would be on notice
when dealing with corporations.'
A second approach to the factors involved in the problem of
mortgages on future property leads to a consideration of the vzrious
kinds of property on which such mortgages have been executed.
The principal subjects are stock in trade, fixtures, machinery, farm
crops, real estate, and the rents, issues, and profits of mortgaged
real estate. Differing rules have developed as to the different kinds
of property mortgaged.
In a recent opinion9 Judge Thomas quoted from Corpus Juris "'
the following rule as to mortgages on stock in trade not yet acquired,
and applied the rule in the case at bar:
"Under another line of authorities a mortgage is
fraudulent and void which permits the mortgagor to sell
from stock from time to time, although he agrees to re-
place any stock sold with stock of equal value; and a
mortgage which is valid on its face is invalidated by
collateral permission to this effect."
In this case a grocery store proprietor had executed mortgages
on his stock in trade. The mortgagee did not obtain any preference,
with respect to subsequent general creditors, as to funds in the hands
' Cheatham v. Tennell's Assignee, 170 Ky, 429, 186 S.W. 128
(1916).
"But cf. Ginsburg, Mortgages on After-Acquired Personalty in
Nebraska (1932) 11 NEB. L. BuLL. 289, for extensive discussion of
the desirability of permitting individuals to execute mortgages on
future personal property.
"Sandy Valley Grocery Co. v. Patrick, 267 Ky. 768, 103 S.W. 2d
307 (1937).
011 C. J. 581, sec. 275.
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of the mortgagor's receiver. The stocks had completely changed
since execution of the mortgage. This case represents the consistent
holding of the Kentucky court."' However, in Kentucky the
mortgagee of a stock in trade does receive preferential treatment as
to property on hand at the time of execution of the mortgage.'
After quoting the rule Judge Thomas, giving the opinion of the
court, attacks it as follows:
"Were the question one of first impression-and if it
were less universally approved-we would be more in-
clined to follow our inclination to say that a mortgage of
the kind here being dealt with, if duly recorded so as to
furnish constructive notice, would prevail over all
creditors who became such thereafter-the same as the
acquiring of actual knowledge of the fact of an unre-
corded lien. The basis of such inclination is that we are
unable to perceive any fraud lurking therein, and there-
fore no invasion of any public policy principle arising
from such an encumbering transaction, if it is made in
good faith and bona fide observed thereafter. It is dif-
ficult to see any greater objections thereto than to a lien
put upon existing property which continues to remain in
the same, or practically the same, condition until the time
of enforcement of the lien. If third parties dealing with
the mortgagor possess either actual or constructive notice
of such prior bona fide transaction, we fail to see wherein
they should not be bound by the mortgage when with
such knowledge they consent to the creation of their sub-
sequent debts. But, however that may be, the stare
decisis rule, so overwhelmingly adopted and approved by
this and all courts, admonishes us that we should not de-
part therefrom, it involving a rule of property."
In Zaring v. Cox's Assignee/' not mentioned by Judge Thomas
in the opinion discussed, the court said the lien of a mortgage on
stock in trade, containing a future property clause, attached as soon
as any stock was added, and, being good between the parties, was
good as to antecedent creditors, unless attacked for fraud. This
"budding heresy" was quickly suppressed in the next case on the
subject to reach the court. In Loth v. Carty,4 1887, the court
rationalized the statement of the Zaring case as meaning merely that
'Patterson v. Louisville Trust Co., 17 Ky. L. Rep. 234, 30 S.W.
872 (1895); Rosenberg v. Thompson, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 332, 8 S.W. 895
(1888); Loth v. Carty, 85 Ky. 591, 4 S.W. 314 (1887); Ross v.
Wilson, Peter & Co., 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 29 (1869); Pindell v. Brown,
6 Ky. Opin. 302 (1873); Lucas v. Temple & Barker, 1 Ky. Opin.
259 (1866); all involving mortgages on future stock in trade, with
contesting creditors; cf. Robinson v. Woodward, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1142,
48 S.W. 1082 (1899), holding a deed of trust of future stock in
trade, executed by an individual, ineffective against attaching
creditors.
'Ross v. Wilson, Peter & Co., 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 29 (1869); see
Sandy Valley Grocery Co. v. Patrick, 267 Ky. 768, 103 S.W. 2d 307
(1937).
*178 Ky. (1 Rod.) 527 (1880).
24 85 Ky. 491, 4 S.W. 314 (1887).
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a mortgage of future property, being constructively fraudulent, was
valid until attacked by another creditor, and that an averment by
such creditor that the mortgage was executed before the property
was acquired would constitute an attack on the lien for fraud.
However, in the Zaring case it appears that the contesting creditors
claimed under an assignment for benefit of creditors, and would
therefore be in no better position than the assignor-mortgagor. Thus
the case is distinguished on its facts, and the statement of the court,
even if taken literally, is without force.
The rigor of the common-law rule was relaxed somewhat by our
legislature in 1934. An act then adopted provided that chattel
mortgages on after-acquired property were to be valid "against the
mortgagor, existing or subsequent creditors of the mortgagor, sub-
sequent purchasers, subsequent lienors and/or incumbrancers, and
any and all third persons . . .," where such mortgages were executed
on "tools, machinery, farming instruments of any and all kinds,"
on crops planted "or to be planted within one year from the date
of such mortgage," and on "livestock . . . including the increase,
issue, progeny and/or produce thereof... "'
As to the increase of animals this enactment was substantially
a statement of the law as theretofore applied in Kentucky, but as
to crops and machinery the rule was materially altered, for
mortgages on future crops and machinery had previously not been
enforced against third party claimants.'
The question of mortgages by individuals on future acquired
real estate has not come before our court, but there has been noth-
ing said by the court to indicate that the general rule against such
mortgages would not be applied, nor that any exception thereto
would be made.
What Judge Thomas calls a "modified exception" to the general
doctrine against mortgaging future property applies to liens on future
rents, issues, and profits of mortgaged real estate. In Bank of
Louisville v. Baumeister four mortgages were placed on a city lot,
only the fourth providing for a lien on the rents, etc., thereof. The
fourth mortgagee was held entitled to such rents over the three
prior mortgagees, the court saying that such future interests might
be mortgaged incident to the mortgage of the present interest in
the real estate.
The "modification" became apparent in other decisions on the
topic. In Watt's Admr. v. Smith" unsecured creditors contested the
"Ky. R. S. (1944) 382.610.
Cheatham v. Tennell's Assignee, 170 Ky. 429, 186 S.W. 128
(1916); Wender Blue Gem Coal Co. v. Louisville Property Co., 137
Ky. 339, 125 S.W. 732 (1910); Haden v. Lindsay, 99 Ky. 59, 34 S.W.
1065, 17 Ky- L. Rep. 1409 (1896); Vinson v. Hallowell, 73 Ky.
(10 Bush) 538 (1874); Hutchinson, McChesney & Co. v. Ford, 72
Ky. (9 Bush) 318 (1872); Note (1943) 31 Ky. L. J. 185.
'87 Ky. 6, 7 S.W. 170, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 845 (1888).
"250 Ky. 617, 63 S.W. 2d 796 (1933).
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lien of a "rents, issues, and profits" clause in a mortgage of farm
real estate, as applied to tobacco raised thereon by the mortgagor.
It was held that the mortgagee had a Hen on all rents, etc., accrued
or thereafter accruing as of the date the mortgagee sought to subject
them to the mortgage, so long as liens of third parties thereon had not
intervened.- As to intervening liens, the court said the issue had
never been decided by our court, and it did not arise in this case.
Two years later (1935), in Southern Trust Co. v. First City Bank
and Trust Co. of Hopkinsville' the question came before the court.
In this case a farm mortgage provided for a lien on the rents, issues,
and profits, further providing that upon action to foreclose the
mortgagor should have the right to have a receiver appointed to col-
lect such rents. The court found that the latter stipulation disclosed
an intent not to subject the income and usufruct to the potential
lien of the mortgage until possession was taken and the lien per-
fected by appointment of the receiver. Therefore a chattel mortgage
on livestock and crops, executed before initiation of foreclosure pro-
ceedings, gave rise to a lien on such livestock and crops superior to
that of the real estate mortgage.
Since 1935 two cases have involved the question of liens on
rents, issues, and profits. In Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. Clark"
it was held that an assignment for benefit of creditors, executed
before initiation of action to foreclose the mortgage and appoint a
receiver for the rents, etc., did not give rise to any such intervening
lien as would take priority over the inchoate lien of the mortgage.
In substantially the same situation it was held by the federal court
that, under Kentucky law, appointment of an equity receiver of the
property and assets of a public service corporation did not create
any lien on rents, issues, and profits superior to the unperfected lien
of the mortgage.' In the Clark case it was said:
'Where the mortgagor, before any action brought to
enforce the mortgage or to appoint a receiver, sells or dis-
poses of the rents, issues, and profits of the property
mortgaged, or mortgages same to third parties, or where
the property in his hands is attached by other creditors,
the lien of the intervening lienholders becomes superior
to .the inchoate right which the mortgagee had to the
same property by virtue of its mortgage."
The Clark case and the American Fuel case are to be dis-
tinguished from the Southern Trust case in that an assignee for
' Accord: Brasfield & Son v. Northwestern Mutual Life In-
surance Co., 233 Ky. 94, 25 S.W. 2d 72 (1930); Handman v. Volk,
30 Ky. L. Rep. 818, 99 S.W. 660 (1907); Bank of Louisville v.
Baumeister, 87 Ky. 6, 67 S.W. 170, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 845 (1888); Newport
and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Douglass, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 673 (1877).
259 Ky. 151, 82 S.W. 2d 205 (1935).
271 Ky. 22, 111 S.W. 2d 409 (1937).
In re American Fuel and Power Co., 151 F. 2d 470 (C.C.A. 6th,
1945).
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benefit of creditors or an equity receiver takes the property of an
insolvent debtor not only for the benefit of general creditors, but
as well for creditors holding a mortgage thereon, whether such
mortgage be inchoate or not. With reference to the assignee or re-
ceiver, all the creditors stand upon the same footing as though the
property remained in the hands of their debtor.
With reference to the law of the several states, there is such
confusion that only the broadest generalizations can be made. Courts
have attempted to draft general rules in cases concerning a par-
ticular type of mortgagor or property, and subsequently have been
placed in untenable positions when confronted with cases falling
within the rules but greatly different as to facts and interests in-
volved. The result has been the introduction of meaningless dis-
tinctions and exceptions in an attempt to make too general rules
fit situations vastly different in substance.
The Massachusetts rule, followed throughout New England and
in some other states, most closely approximates the common-law.
In Massachusetts a mortgage on future property is valid against
third parties where, and only where, the lien is perfected by the
mortgagee taking possession of the mortgaged property before the
rights of third parties are asserted.' New York follows the Mas-
sachusetts rule as to third party creditors, but applies the so-called
equity rule when the third party is a purchaser. 4 The equity rule,
based on the decision of Judge Story in Mitchell v. Winslow, supra,
interprets a mortgage on after-acquired property not as passing any
title, but as creating an equitable interest in the property at the
time of its acquisition by the mortgagor, secondary to any equities
then existing, whether junior or senior to the general mortgage.-'
Several Western states have enacted general statutes in attempts
to clear the atmosphere. Representative is that of Montana, which
reads:
'In re Robert Jenkins Corp., 17 F. 2d 555 (C.C.A. 1st, 1927);
Davis v. Smith-Springfield Body Corp., 250 Mass. 278, 145 N.E. 434
(1924); Cohen and Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause
(1939) 87 U. of PA. L. REV. 635, 639.
" Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632
(1894); Kribbs v. Alvord, 120 N.Y. 519, 24 N.E. 811 (1890); WALSH,
MORTGAGES (1934) sec. 10; Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New
York (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 519, 526-7.
31 Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 Fed. Cas. 527, No. 9,673 (C.C.D.Me.,
1843); Moulder-Halcomb Co. v. Glasgow Cooperage Co., 173 Ky. 519,
191 S.W. 275 (1917); First Nat. Bank of Alexandria v. Turnbull,
73 Va. 695, 34 Am. Rep. 791 (1880); Homer-Gaylord Co. v. Fawcett,
50 W. Va. 487, 40 S.W. 564 (1901); Holyrod v. Marshall, 10 H. L.
Cases 191, 10 Eng. Rul. Cas. 426 (1862); 10 AM. Jua. 736-738, sec. 29.
'CALIF. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1941) sec. 2883; IDAHO CODE ANNq.
(1932) sec. 44-107; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. (1935) sec. 8227; N. D.
COMP. LAWS (1913) sec. 6706; OKLA. STATS. (1941) tit. 42, sec. 8; S. D.
CODE (1939) sec. 39.0105.
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
"An agreement may be made to create a lien upon
property not yet acquired by the party agreeing to give
the lien, or not yet in existence. In such case the lien
agreed for attaches from the time when the party agree-
ing to give it acquires an- interest in the thing, to the
extent of such interest."
Many states follow the equity rule without benefit of statute,
particularly as to land, but have made exceptions as to various types
of property; the most frequent exception being a refusal to hold valid
against third parties a mortgage on after-acquired stock in trade. '
Some states have a statutory provision, similar in effect to Ken-
tucky's, limiting mortgages on future crops to those to be grown
within one year; ' while a Georgia statute provides that such
mortgages are valid only where made to secure advances for the
"purpose of making and gathering crops embraced by the
mortgage.."" Such statutes have the laudable purpose of prevent-
ing the reduction of tenant farmers and sharecroppers to a state
of peonage, to which condition they might well be reduced were it
within their power to encumber the more remote fruits of their
labors. 0
An Ohio statute" has preserved for that state the distinction
between the power of a quasi-public and a private corporation to
mortgage future property, and Pennsylvania apparently has fol-
lowed the same distinction without a governing statute."
Thus we see that Kentucky has tended to give less efficacy to
future property mortgages than have most of her sister states.
Mortgages by individuals on future real estate, stock in trade, and
fixtures have not yet been enforced and, barring legislation, it is
not to be expected that they will be. Such mortgages are en-
forced against third parties (1) when executed by corporations
and (2) when the subject matter is crops to be grown within one
year, machinery, farm tools, or the increase of female animals.
Where a mortgage of present real estate provides for a lien on the
future rents, issues, and profits thereof, there is an inchoate lien,
which, if perfected, will precede the liens of subsequently inter-
vening third parties.
W. E. FRANCIS
7 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES (5th ed. 1908) sec. 415; Cohen and
Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 635, 650 and n. 82.
"ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 47, sec. 161; ARK. DIG. STATS. (POPE,
1937) see. 9446.
GA. CIV. CODE (Michie Supp., 1932) sec. 3256(a).
' OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1938) sec. 8623-75.
'Susquehanna Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. United Tel. & Tel.
Co., 6 F. 2d 179 (1925); Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Com-
pany, 250 Pa. 194, 95 Ati. 451 (1915); Hamilton, Future Property
Clauses in Corporate Mortgages (1930) 4 TEMP. L. Q. 131, 145-147.
